Jonas Olson is Reader in Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University. He received his PhD from Uppsala University in 2005. In 2005-2008 he was a Fellow at Brasenose College and Departmental Lecturer in Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford. He has held visiting positions at the University of Otago, CEPPA (Centre for Ethics, Philosophy, and Public Affairs) at the University of St Andrews, and at Universite de Montreal. Olson works mainly in metaethics, value theory, and history of moral philosophy. He is co-editor with Iwao Hirose of The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory (OUP USA, forthcoming) and he has published several articles in peer-reviewed collections and journals, such as such as Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Hume Studies, Mind, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophy and Phenomenological esearch, Ratio, and Utilitas.
Table of Contents
PART I: HISTORY
2. Hume: Projectivist, Realist, and Error Theorist
3. Hagerstrom: Projectivist, Non-Cognitivist, and Error Theorist
4. Other Precursors of Moral Error Theory
PART II: CRITIQUE
5. How to Understand Mackie's Argument from Queerness (I)
6. How to Understand Mackie's Argument from Queerness (II)
7. Debunking Moral Belief
PART III: DEFENCE
8. Ramifications of Moral Error Theory
9. Moral Error Theory, and Then What?