Certain representations are bound in a special way to our sensory capacities. Many pictures show things as looking certain ways, for instance, while auditory mental images show things as sounding certain ways. What do all those distinctively sensory representations have in common, and what makes them different from representations of other kinds? Dominic Gregory argues that they are alike in having meanings of a certain special type. He employs a host of novel ideas relating to kinds of perceptual states, sensory perspectives, and sensory varieties of meaning to provide a detailed account of the special nature of the contents which belong to distinctively sensory representations. The resulting theory is then used to shed light on a wide range of intellectual issues. Some of the topics addressed in Showing, Sensing, and Seeming relate to distinctively sensory representations in general, but many of them concern distinctively sensory representations of more specific kinds. The book contains detailed philosophical examinations of sensory mental imagery and pictures, for instance, and of memory, photography, and analogous nonvisual phenomena.
Dominic Gregory studied philosophy at University College London and Trinity College, Cambridge. After a Research Fellowship at Jesus College, Cambridge, he joined the philosophy department at the University of Sheffield. He has published work on aesthetics, epistemology, logic, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind. His work has appeared in various journals including Nous, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophical Quarterly, the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosopher's Imprint, Mind and Language, and the British Journal of Aesthetics. University of Sheffield. He has published papers on aesthetics, logic, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind.